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The Treatment of Isolationist Minorities
Gabriel Rauterberg*
This Note examines what may be the most radical challenge posed by
religious subcultures to the liberal politics of modern industrial nations-
that of isolationist, nonliberal (or even illiberal) religious minorities.
These subcultures do not seek to integrate with mainstream society or gain
power within it, but to withdraw in order to maintain norms widely
discrepant from those that are socially dominant. They often seek to place
restrictions upon their own members' freedom or activities, in part to
maintain the group's differences from the greater society. These cultures,
characterized by features as distinctive as collective property ownership,
pacificism, and the rejection of the separation of church and state,' pose a
serious challenge to liberalism's self-understanding and the norms of
liberal tolerance.
This Note will begin in Part One by introducing a distinction drawn by
Will Kymlicka between two different types of social restrictions which an
isolationist cultural minority might seek to impose on its members.2
Kymlicka defends what he calls "external" restrictions as compatible with
the principles of liberalism and critiques "internal" restrictions as inimical
to a liberal society. I will, however, offer an argument for why at least
some internal restrictions should be permitted and enforced by a liberal
state. The argument will focus on the key concept of liberal tolerance3 and
the implications of this principle for society. Guided by this theoretical
framework, I turn in Part Two to two legal cases involving paradigmatic
isolationist religious minorities-the Hutterites of Canada and the Amish
in the United States. In Part Three, I propose a legal test to differentiate
between permissible and impermissible internal restrictions.
* J.D., Yale Law School, 2009. The author would like to thank Aharon Barak, David Leszczynski,
Andrew Verstein, and the editors of the Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities for helpful comments
on earlier drafts of this Note.
1. ALVIN J. ESAU, THE COURTS AND THE COLONIES: THE LITIGATION OF HUTTERITE CHURCH
DISPUTES 35 (2004).
2. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A NEW THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 34-37
(1995).
3. See, e.g., RONALD DwORKN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY(2000).
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I. THE MORAL UNIVERSE OF INTERNAL RESTRICTIONS
In a series of sophisticated works, Canadian philosopher Will Kymlicka,
one of the world's premier scholars of multiculturalism, has advanced a
defense of group rights and a conceptual framework for understanding a
broad spectrum of multicultural issues.4  Kymlicka advocates
governmental interventions on behalf of multiculturalist goals, to enhance
the power of minorities vis-A-vis majorities. He explicitly situates his
defense of such interventions within a tradition of liberal philosophy
characterized by its valorization of individual rights, freedom, and
equality.5 It is in the context of a liberal viewpoint that Kymlicka draws a
fundamental distinction between what he calls "internal" and "external"
restrictions. His aim is to reassure liberals that government policies that
promote multiculturalism and protect group rights pose no threat to
individual liberties because they are typically external in kind.
Conversely, internal restrictions should not be and usually are not pursued
by Western governments.6
The principal differences between the two kinds of restrictions are their
target and their motivating rationale. External restrictions target members
of the majority, seeking to restrain the majority's power or in some way
empower the minority with respect to the dominant group. Internal
restrictions target members of the minority culture itself, constraining the
freedom of some of its members in order to empower the group as a
whole. As Kymlicka puts it, both restrictions aim at protecting a
community from destabilizing influence, but an internal restriction is
"intended to protect the group from the destabilizing impact of internal
dissent (e.g., the decision of individual members not to follow traditional
practices or customs), whereas [an external restriction] is intended to
protect the group from the impact of external decisions (e.g., the economic
or political decisions of the larger society)."7 Kymlicka also distinguishes
between the two types of restrictions on the basis of how they mediate the
minority's relationship with the majority. If the limitation is designed to
protect group identity by resisting the larger society, then it is external, but
if it aims to preserve group homogeneity, it is internal. Kymlicka places a
heavy emphasis on this distinction, arguing that while liberals should
advocate external restrictions as promoting fairness among groups, they
should oppose internal restrictions, which limit individuals' capacity to
destabilize and reform groups from within.8
4. WILL KYMLICKA, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1990); WILL KYMLICKA,
LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE (1989); WILL KYMLICKA & BAOGANG HE,
MULTICULTURALISM IN ASIA (2005).
5. JOHN GRAY, LIBERALISM (1995).
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The multicultural policies of Western nations provide a wealth of
instances of both classes of restrictions, but a few examples should suffice
to clarify the distinction. A paradigmatic external restriction would be a
guaranteed seat for a minority in a national parliament or on the nation's
constitutional court. This "special group representation right," as
Kymlicka calls it, is designed to decrease the likelihood of the society's
majority dominating the minority and ignoring its distinctive needs when
creating national policies.9 A classic example of an internal restriction is
the Amish practice, held to be a constitutional right by the United States
Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Yoder, of withdrawing their children from
school before it is legal for other parents to do so.'" This special group
right aims to preserve the cultural distinctiveness of the Amish.
Unlike Kymlicka, I believe that at least some internal restrictions that
minority groups may seek to impose upon their members are defensible
from inside liberalism, so to speak. After describing the concept of liberal
tolerance, I will aim my argument at a society shaped by such tolerance.
The arguments I will present are not designed to justify all internal
restrictions-some, such as corporal punishment for heretics or female
genital mutilation should clearly not be enforced or legitimized by the
political apparatus of any state." Rather, the arguments are intended to
demonstrate the powerful moral case for permitting at least some "internal
restrictions" and to establish a presumption in their favor, which should
sometimes trump otherwise valid laws. Then, after exploring some legal
and sociological particulars of how isolationist minorities have been
treated in the United States and Canada, I will articulate a more detailed,
operational legal test for distinguishing among permissible and
impermissible internal limitations.
In sketching these arguments I also hope to expose the volatility of
Kymlicka's distinction between internal and external restrictions by
showing that most internal restrictions are really attempts at external
restrictions-they endeavor to limit the influence of the dominant
9. Id. at 37. Kymlicka differentiates among three different categories of group-differentiated
rights (his term for rights created by governmental multiculturalist policies).
Special group representation rights within the political institutions of the larger
society make it less likely that a national or ethnic minority will be ignored on
decisions that are made on a country-wide basis. Self-government rights devolve
powers to smaller political units, so that a national minority cannot be outvoted
or outbid by the majority on decisions that are of particular importance to their
culture .... Polyethnic rights protect specific religious and cultural practices
which might not be adequately supported through the market .... Id. at 37-38.
10. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Indeed, the examples chosen in this paper were
chosen because they are analyzed by Will Kymlicka himself, sharpening the contrast between the
conclusions he and I come to regarding them.
11. See generally Rebecca J. Cook, Bernard M Dicken & Mahmoud F. Fathalla, REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: INTEGRATING MEDICINE, ETHICS, AND LAW 262 (2003); Bettina Shell-
Duncan, The Medicalization of Female "Circumcision ": Harm Reduction or Promotion of a
Dangerous Practice?, 52 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1013-1028 (2001).
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society's decisions and norms on the group, albeit by restricting the
members of the group itself However, as I hope to make clear, the intra-
group character of these restrictions is foisted upon minorities by the
nature of liberal tolerance.
The liberal philosophical tradition is now several centuries old and is
characterized by the work of too many significant thinkers to be reducible
to a simple creed.' 2 However, modern liberal philosophers articulating
theories of political morality have emphasized certain discernible
themes. 13 The most significant element for present purposes could be
characterized as neutrality-focused liberalism. Such liberalism advocates
that the government remain neutral with respect to particular moral issues.
The consistency of this theme across the work of many otherwise very
different liberal philosophers is striking. In the work of Jtirgen Habermas,
neutrality is the upshot of his central distinction between "morality" and
"ethics."'" In John Rawls, a commitment to neutrality stems from his
advocacy of a political conception of justice and his distinction between
public reason and more "comprehensive" doctrines.15  For Bruce
Ackerman, an extreme version of liberal tolerance is foundational to his
basic argument.'6
Ronald Dworkin, who I take to be representative of this tradition, offers
a particularly clear statement of "liberal tolerance," which is his term for a
kind of state neutrality with respect to the values and life-plans of
particular citizens. 7 Dworkin acknowledges that the requirement of
neutrality is "for many people, the most problematic feature of liberal
equality., 18  As Dworkin puts it, the idea of neutrality is that as a
"principle of political morality ... government must not punish or
discriminate against people because it disapproves of their ethical
convictions." 9  When specifically applied to the law, liberal tolerance
mandates that individuals "must not use the law, even when they are in the
12. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary Gregor
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1785); JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT (Peter
Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ Press 1960) (1689); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich
& George Kateb eds., 2003) (1869).
13. BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY
OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999); JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
14. Jirgen Habermas, Reply to Symposium Participants, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1477 (1996); see
also JORGEN HABERMAS, JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION 154 (Ciaran P. Cronin trans., MIT Press
1993) (1990).
15. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 59-60 (1993). The validity of these claims has been
subjected to trenchant criticism by opponents of political liberalism, see, e.g., Robert P. George &
Christopher Wolfe, Natural Law and Liberal Public Reason, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 31 (1997), but liberalism
remains the dominant Anglo-American political philosophy.
16. ACKERMAN, supra note 13.
17. DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 211; see, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS
OF JUSTICE (1982); John Finnis, On 'Public Reason' (Oxford Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 1, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-955815.
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majority, to forbid anyone to lead the life he wants, or punish him for
doing so, just on the ground that his ethical convictions are, as they
believe, profoundly wrong.,2 ° Liberal tolerance denies that an action may
be criminalized solely because of its moral wrongfulness; the moral
rightness or wrongness of some behavior is not a valid reason for state
action.
I am not interested here in defending liberal tolerance in general, nor
any specific justification or interpretation of the principle, other than
assuming a broadly Dworkinian understanding of it.2 l Rather, I will
attempt to demonstrate how internal restrictions can be justified even
within a framework of liberal tolerance-the very framework under which
objections to internal restrictions are typically raised.
The place to begin is with some implications of the principle of liberal
tolerance. Liberal tolerance eschews the criminalization of any activity
solely because of its immorality, but not because of a skepticism
concerning the truth of ethical propositions; liberal tolerance, after all,
claims to be a true principle of justice. Rather, proponents of liberal
tolerance are able to admit the wrongfulness of the very conduct they
refuse to intervene against. It is part of the self-understanding of liberal
tolerance that it permits wrongs to occur, which the majority may know to
be immoral, but which it must, for the sake of justice, refrain from
suppressing, and this has a profound impact on the social environment of a
polity.
Indeed, a society committed to liberal tolerance knowingly permits an
imperfect moral environment to exist. Human beings exist in society, and
every society, and each subculture and group within it, is characterized by
a certain social ethos. Other people's beliefs, ideas, actions, and activities
produce the social environment within which we live, and that
environment inevitably affects and influences our own behavior. Dworkin
makes this point with particular force:
How others treat me-and my own sense of identity and self-
respect-are determined in part by the mix of social conventions,
opinions, tastes, convictions, prejudices, life styles, and cultures that
flourish in the community in which I live. Liberals are sometimes
accused of thinking that what people say or [] think in private has no
impact on anyone except themselves, and that is plainly wrong.
Someone to whom religion is of fundamental importance, for
example, will obviously lead a very different and perhaps more
satisfying life in a community in which most other people share his
convictions than in a dominantly secular society of atheists for whom
his beliefs are laughable superstitions.
20. Id. at 283.
21. Under some interpretations of liberal tolerance, the importance of social environment is so
understood that it creates a valid reason for the state to intervene. See Finnis, supra note 17.
2010]
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Exactly because the moral environment in which we all live is in
good part created by others, however, the question of who shall have
the power to help shape that environment, and how, is of fundamental
importance, though it is often neglected in political theory.22
Dworkin seems just right here. Our lives and our ability to construct
certain visions of what constitutes a good life are profoundly shaped by
the environment within which we find ourselves-a morally shaping
environment that is constituted in part by the actions, choices, and
examples of other individuals. By permitting moral wrongdoing, not
because it is impossible to prevent it, but because justice will not permit its
suppression, liberal tolerance allows for the contamination of the moral
environment in which individuals develop and act. As a result, the moral
ecology 23 within which citizens of a liberally tolerant polity live is
profoundly imperfect. If pornography, obscene materials, and neo-Nazi
hatefulness, just to use Dworkin's examples,24 are allowed to subsist
within a society, they produce an unsound milieu for human development.
The refusal of liberal tolerance to employ the state as a forum for
evaluating conceptions of the good life should give us pause for two
important, but very different reasons. First, one significant motivation for
liberal tolerance is a commitment to allowing individuals to freely
construct their own vision of the good life. 25 What I want to underline is
that internal restrictions are an important tool with which persons pursue
this liberal project of individual self-creation. For although this project is
viewed as a solitary achievement, it is one that many individuals (if not
everyone) will seek to involve the help of others in pursuing. Cooperative
aid in the project of shaping one's life will take many forms. Emotional
and intellectual support, the establishment of models for living, and the
creation of a sense of community can all be important in sustaining one's
desired vision of the good life. One of the primary benefits of such
cooperation will be assistance in self-binding-in preventing oneself from
acting contrary to long-term preferences at specific moments of weakness,
vacillation, or temptation.26  Communities here act analogously to
Odysseus' crew-members binding him to the mast. Internal restrictions
will often operate as such a form of strategic cooperation, such as self-
binding-as a way in which individuals assist each other in persevering in
22. Ronald Dworkin, Women and Pornography, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 21, 1993, at 36,
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/13790.
23. ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1993).
24. Dworkin, supra note 22.
25 See, e.g., GARY GUTTING, PRAGMATIC LIBERALISM AND THE CRrIQUE OF MODERNITY 60 (198);
RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY xv (1989).
26 See Joseph Heath, The Benefits of Cooperation, 34 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 313 (2006).
[Vol 22:105
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their difficult projects. If an individual definitively rejects his initial
project, of course, the existence of these self-binding strategies will
become a grave nuisance. Nonetheless, a liberal state motivated by a
desire to facilitate individual self-creation, which forbade internal
restrictions, would be partially self-defeating. For collective assistance in
self-binding or in defense against contaminatory influences will often be
crucial to individuals' success in achieving their constructive projects, and
liberalism bars the use of the state itself as a medium for organizing such
cooperation.
The second rationale for permitting internal restrictions given
liberalism's relationship to moral environment abstracts from individual
projects and looks at social flourishing in a more universal light. The full
flourishing of human persons, and particularly children, requires a certain
kind of moral environment; namely, one conducive to moral virtue.
Without such an environment, it will be more difficult for persons to build
themselves up, with and through their communities, as fully virtuous
moral individuals. In a degraded moral ecology, there will be marked
external impediments to the capacity of persons to acquire virtue. People
thus have a legitimate claim in justice to develop within and pursue the
creation of a certain kind of moral environment-one that would be fully
conducive to their moral well-being.
Yet, because liberal tolerance is (we are assuming) a peremptory norm
of political justice, the government cannot permit the populace, and
persons cannot permit themselves, to seek an ideal moral environment
through the suppression of degrading voices via the coercive legal
machinery of the state. Of course a moral environment, like an economic
system, is not the product of individual human choice, but of collectively
engaged individuals. A characteristic way in which individuals
collectively pursue common ends on a large scale is the state, "the public
managing structure of the political community."'27 But under the principle
of liberal tolerance, that path is closed off. The upshot of liberal tolerance,
then, is that the state is under a weighty obligation to enable collectivities
to non-politically create their own moral environments.
The greater the extent to which a polity consciously blocks efforts by
the state to ensure a sound moral environment, the greater the importance
of allowing discrete groups to create and protect distinct moral ecologies.
The important question then is whether internal restrictions serve a
necessary role in the construction of a distinctive moral environment. The
significance of such restrictions is not difficult to see. In order to preserve
a particular moral ecology, a group must filter out certain external
influences, lest its members be subsumed into the dominant society. After
27. John Finnis, Is Natural Law Theory Compatible with Limited Government?, in NATURAL
LAW, LIBERALISM, AND MORALITY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 1, 6-7 (Robert P. George ed., 1996).
2010]
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all, the point of a social ecology, like a natural ecology, is the influence
that it has on individuals, who as of yet, have no fixed set of beliefs or at
least are subject to change. Tolerant liberal societies permit a broad range
of objectionable influences, which create a particular kind of moral
environment. A primary way for a non-political group to preserve and
protect an alternative moral environment is to pressure group members
themselves to censor outside influences. As we will see in the cases of the
Hutterites and the Amish, this filtering function is the rationale for many
of the internal restrictions sought by minority subcultures. Internal
restrictions designed to guard group members from morally corrosive
influences thus appear as a form of social self-defense against the sort of
imperfect dominant culture that liberalism-because of its commitment to
liberal tolerance-produces.
If Dworkinian liberalism is sound or even if it is merely the motivating
rationale for our dominant social and legal arrangements, then it is crucial
that we permit distinct moral ecologies to exist. If as a matter of political
morality, certain social or moral pathologies must inevitably be permitted
by the state, then individuals deserve the ability to construct protective
mechanisms around themselves, their families, and their communities. To
refuse them this opportunity is to render these individuals defenseless
against a corrosive, non-ideal moral environment. Nor can a liberally
tolerant state judge amongst internal restrictions on the basis of their
ability to conduce to a superior or inferior moral environment. Liberal
tolerance precludes state action solely on the basis of an act or practice's
moral merit; it forbids adjudicating among restrictions on the basis of their
intrinsic compatibility with the good life.
II: THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF ISOLATIONIST GROUPS
A: The Hutterites in Canada
In North America today, there are religious minorities that withdraw
from the dominant society and seek to create radically different ways of
life. Many of these isolationist religious communities are the descendants
of the Radical Reformation of the sixteenth century.28 Among the most
extreme of these religious reformers were the Anabaptists, of which the
Hutterites, Amish, and Mennonites are descendants. The Anabaptists
were persecuted for their insistence on doctrinal purity and for the extent
to which they sought to realize that purity in their way of life.29 Fleeing
28. Paul Peachey, The Radical Reformation, Political Pluralism, and the Corpus Christianum, in
THE ORIGINS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF ANABAPTISM 10, 14 (Marc Lienhard ed., 1977); Kenneth R.
Davis, The Origins of Anabaptism: Ascetic and Charismatic Elements Exemplifying Continuity and
Discontinuity, in THE ORIGINS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF ANABAPTISM 27 (Marc Lienhard ed., 1977).
29. ESAU, supra note 1, at 3-5.
[Vol 22:105
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political suppression, several Anabaptist groups immigrated to North
America, eventually settling in various sites across the United States and
Canada.3"
The Hutterites are among the largest, best-documented, and most
distinctive of these Anabaptist groups. Before considering legal cases in
which they have been involved, it is worthwhile to highlight the cultural
and philosophical uniqueness of the Hutterites, which is essential to
understanding the complex dynamics that characterize their interaction
with industrial society.
The Hutterites have certain core beliefs that ensure their distinctiveness.
They engage only in adult voluntary baptism, practice nonviolence (the
refusal to violently resist aggressors, including during war),31 live in
agricultural colonies, and have a collective ownership scheme in which no
individual possesses any private property.32 It is difficult to underestimate
the extent to which the latter two practices isolate the Hutterites from
mainstream Western society and guarantee a certain amount of uneasiness
in their interaction with the state.
Communal property, which emerges as a source of considerable
controversy in Hutterite litigation, is vital to the Hutterian way of life:
The concept of communal property... means that all property within
the group is church property. We can think of a Hutterite colony,
including all the land... as being a church, an "ark of salvation" set
down in a "fallen" world. Hutterites live in a church, as compared
with the modern secular-sacred division of life, where we go to
church occasionally. 33
For the Hutterite, the colony may be thought of as a communal
ark... that leads to eternal life in heaven, while the rest of the world
is drowning in the flood of temporary selfish pride and pleasure
leading to death.34
The significance of communal property is also clear within the
constitution of the Hutterian Brethren Church.35 The purposes of the
30. Id. at 5-7.
31. Id. at 35.
32. Id. at 1-2.
33. Id. at 3.
34. Id. at x. Creating a social ethos conducive to a virtuous life for an individual is an instance of
what has been called a "collective freedom." Such freedoms involve capacities to achieve some
desideratum that are impossible to exercise as an individual. One person alone cannot create a social
ethos; only the collective pursuit of it renders the goal attainable. PETER SINGER, MARX: A VERY
SHORT INTRODUCTION (2001) (discussing the capacity for changing the basic structure of the economy
as a collective freedom).
35. Hofer v. Hofer, [1992] 3 S.C.R. (Can.) 165, at 14 "This document is in the form of articles
of association, and was executed by the representatives of 60 Hutterite colonies across Canada on
2010]
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church are defined in Article 2, including that "the members achieve one
entire spiritual unit in complete community of goods ... in perfect unity in
mutual relationships . .. "36 This communal property scheme enables and
requires a form of life very different from the kind of individualism that
thrives in contemporary Western society.
The Hutterites' collectivistic distribution of goods is explicitly viewed
as integral to the moral environment sought by the community. It is not
merely an expression of their view of the world, but an instrument to its
success and a sign of that success. As John Hostetler puts it, Hutterites
believe that the "natural, or carnal, desires of the individual ... are
considered so strong that the help of the community is essential if life is to
be lived according to the divine order."37 Mark Caldwell notes that the
Hutterites have long "espoused an insular ecclesiology whereby the
intrinsically demonic world was rendered incapable of destroying
Christian discipleship" and in which the traditional Christian idea of extra
ecclesiam nulla salus ("there is no salvation outside (or without) the
Church") is "applied not to a hierarchical or salvation dispensing church
but to the brotherhood itself."38
The Hutterites also diverge from the dominant understanding of the
separation of church and state.39 Modern society has seen the relative
privatization of religion as it passed from a source of moral norms for
political society to a voluntary arrangement engaged in at a largely non-
political level.40 In contrast, the Hutterites reject the separation of the
sacred and the secular:
The inside law of the church is comprehensive and applies to the
whole life of the disciple. What you have is ... the church
community, which is supposed to live all of life according to the law
and love of Christ ... and you have the "world" community, which is
not yet redeemed .... [this requires] integration for church members
of all of their life into the jurisdiction of the church, and therefore the
radical totalistic sovereign jurisdiction of the church .... "
Consequently, while most minorities seek some form of engagement with
mainstream society, if only in order to transform it, the stance struck by
the Hutterites is one of withdrawal, separation, and isolation.
Alongside their philosophical and social distinctiveness, the Hutterites
August 1, 1950." (Hofer I).
36. Id. (quoting Article 2).
37. JOHN A. HOSTETLER, HUTTERITE SOCIETY 190 (1974).
38. Mark S. Caldwell, Dissertation Abstract, 39 CHURCH HISTORY 571, 571 (1970).
39. Chris Eberle & Terence Cuneo, Religion and Political Theory, The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2009 Edition), available at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/religion-politics.
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have also marked out a unique place in Canadian society through a curious
stream of litigation that has flowed from their colonies. The cases I will
consider involve disputes over the Hutterites' collectivistic property
scheme. The first is Hofer v. Hofer, [1970] S.C.R. 958 (Can.) (Hofer I).
Hofer I involved a number of adult Hutterites, the Hofers, who lived in the
Interlake Colony of Hutterian Brethren. The Hofers converted to the
Radio Church of God, a religion at odds with Hutterianism and stopped
participating in the religious life of the colony.42 After declaring their
fealty to the Radio Church of God, the Hofers were expelled from their
colony. They then brought the case that reached the Canadian Supreme
Court and became Hofer I, seeking to invalidate their expulsion and to
recover their share of the colony's assets.43
The contentions of the Hofers were many. They claimed that "the
contract embodied in the articles of association. .. [was] contrary to
public policy and therefore void, being destructive of the freedom of
religion and reducing the appellants to the condition of serfdom."' They
also claimed in the alternative that "the articles of association purport to
give ministers of the Church... unlimited power and control over the life
and property of the plaintiffs and that the agreement is therefore contrary
to public policy."'4
The Canadian Supreme Court began by noting some basic facts about
the Hutterites, including the essential role played by communal property in
the Hutterian way of life.46 The Court also noted that as adults the Hofers
had signed the colony's articles of association, in which all assets were
declared colony property for communal use.47 The colony was not an
ordinary commercial enterprise, but a component of a church whose
fundamental aim was the realization of a particular conception of
Christianity.48 Accordingly, it would be improper to equate the colony
with a business partnership and apply the governing precedents of
business law.49
The Court then upheld the validity of the Hofers' expulsion. The
Hofers, after converting to the Radio Church of God, had denied the
propriety of many Hutterian religious festivals, changed the date upon
42. Hofer v. Hofer, [1970] S.C.R. 958 (Can.), at 34 (Hofer I).
43. Id. at 18.
44. Id. at 10.
45. Id. at 20.
46. Id. at 26. The Court adopted the eloquent language of the trial judge in the case, stating "To
a Hutterian the whole life is the Church. The colony is a congregation of people in spiritual
brotherhood.... They are not farming just to be farming-it is the type of livelihood that allows the
greatest assurance of independence from the surrounding world." Id. at 27.
47. Id.at 10,31.
48. Id. at 28; see also Barickman Hutterian Mutual Corp. v. Nault, Lafrenieere and Zastre,
[1939] S.C.R. (Can.) 223, reversing [1938] 1 W.W.R. 777.
49. Id. at 28.
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which they celebrated the Sabbath, and ceased to eat pork.5" The colony
made several efforts to reincorporate the Hofers, including lengthy
discussions with ministers and the imposition of a penalty that the Hofers
refused to recognize. Ultimately, the colony expelled the Hofers in a
meeting the Court decided was not "contrary to natural justice or
otherwise invalid."51  The point of the colony was to be exclusively
Hutterian and the church thus possessed basic authority over
membership.52
The Court also dismissed the other public policy contentions made by
the Hofers.53 Chief Justice Cartwright responded to the claim that the
Hutterites' expulsion of members without property violated freedom of
religion. He declared "[t]he principle of freedom of religion is not
violated by an individual who agrees that if he abandons membership in a
specified Church he shall give up any claim to certain assets."54 He also
emphasized the necessity of the current practice for the survival of the
Hutterites as a distinctive moral community:
[O]ne of the liberties chiefly prized by a normal man is the liberty to
bind himself. Unless the members are free to enter into contracts of
the sort set out in the articles of association, it is difficult to see how
the Hutterian Brethren could carry on the form of religious life which
they believe to be the right one. The appellants ... remain free to
change their religion but they have contracted that if they do so and
leave the Colony, voluntarily or by expulsion, they will not demand
any of its assets.5
Hofer I is a demonstration of the Canadian Supreme Court's nuanced
understanding of how a Hutterite colony actually operates. It is also a
decision that underlined how essential the colony's internal restrictions
were to the Hutterites' survival as a unique entity. The internal
restrictions here were conceptualized as a tool used to sustain the Hutterite
way of life, rather than as a hammer against dissenters.
Hofer v. Hofer, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 165 (Hofer I) offered the Canadian
Supreme Court a second chance to examine Hutterite colony practices.
Unlike Hofer I however, which had dealt with the substantive
permissibility of an internal restriction, Hofer II dealt with how an internal
restriction may be imposed. Again, as in Hofer 1, the case dealt with
members of a Hutterite colony who had been expelled for apostasy and
were challenging the validity of their expulsion. The Court set itself the
task of determining whether the expulsion had occurred pursuant to "the
50. Id. at 34.
51. Id. at 40.
52. Id. at 41.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 9.
55. Id. at 12.
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applicable rules ... the principles of natural justice, and without mala
fides. '5 6
The institutional framework constituting the Hutterites' internal rules is
complex, encompassing the Church constitution, the colony's articles of
association, the statutory act that first incorporated the Hutterian Brethren
Church, and Hutterite informal customs and practices. 57 In a lengthy
opinion, the Court carefully scrutinized the interactions among these
various sources of norms, the requirements for a valid expulsion, and the
byzantine process through which the Hofers were actually expelled.58 The
Court also held that the expulsion must satisfy "the most basic
requirements" of natural justice, which were "notice, opportunity to make
representations, and an unbiased tribunal."59
While the Court found that many of the Hutterites' requirements for
valid expulsion had been fulfilled, the basic requirement of sufficient
notice had not been satisfied.' The Court declared that "natural justice
requires procedural fairness no matter how obvious the decision to be
made may be" and that the failure to warn the Hofers that their expulsion
would be considered at an upcoming colony meeting invalidated their
expulsion.6'
While perhaps less dramatic, Hofer Il-no less than Hofer I-represents a
successful application of the Canadian Supreme Court's subtle approach
to Hutterite disputes. The Court carefully analyzes the relevant norms and
facts and places basic liberal limits on the manner in which internal
restrictions may be imposed. This is a salutary example of the proper way
in which courts can preclude the imposition of internal restrictions. The
restriction is being conceptualized as a tool which the community uses for
self-preservation, but which must be used in a fair manner. An internal
restriction imposed in bad faith, for purposes unrelated to the community's
moral ecology, contrary to its own rules, or in a procedurally defective
manner, will not properly contribute to the normative goals I sketched
earlier.
B. The Amish in the United States
The Amish are the subject of a vast literature that I will not attempt to
survey here. Instead, I will supply some brief historical and cultural
context before considering one of the most significant cases dealing with
Amish internal restrictions. Like the Hutterites, Amish Christianity was
56. Hofer v. Hofer, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 165 (Can.), at 10 (Hofer H).
57. Id. at 12-66.
58. Id. at 66-79, 87-145.
59. Id. at 80.
60. Id. at 158.
61. Id. at 164, 174.
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born of radical elements in the sixteenth century Protestant Reformation.62
Subject to severe persecution from the beginning, the Anabaptist ancestors
of the Amish came in waves to North America.63 Also, like the Hutterites,
"Amish communities today are characterized by a fundamental belief that
salvation requires life in a church community separate and apart from the
world and worldly influence."'  Donald Kraybill summarizes the clash
between the Amish and the industrial state: "These duels are essentially
face-offs between the Goliath of modernity and shepherds from traditional
pastures. These conflicts of conviction.., mark a collision of
cultures .... Negotiating with Caesar is, in essence, negotiating with
modernity. 65
The confrontation between two Amish groups, the Old Order Amish and
Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, and the government of Wisconsin
is detailed in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 66 The Amish had refused to send their
children to school after the eighth grade, violating Wisconsin's
compulsory education laws mandating formal schooling until age sixteen.
The government fined the Amish, who then brought a suit that eventually
reached the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court engaged in a survey of Amish
history and tradition and concluded that formal schooling and Amish
religious beliefs were genuinely incompatible, and that as a result, the
First Amendment entitled the Amish to an exemption from otherwise
legally required schooling insofar as the law conflicted with the Amish
faith.67
The Amish objection to high school holds that it exposes their children
to a culture that is antithetical to the Amish way of life. Indeed, it is
undeniable that any high school in principle and certainly contemporary
U.S. high schools in practice contain a particularized culture in which
students are submersed. American high schools emphasize "self-
distinction, competitiveness, [and] worldly success," all of which are
inimical to Amish views of good community, which emphasize "wisdom,
rather than technical knowledge; community welfare, rather than
competition; and separation from, rather than integration with,
contemporary worldly society. High school would also remove Amish
youth from the community during years crucial to their religious and
vocational development. The Court noted the rather dramatic judgment of
one expert who testified that "compulsory high school attendance
62. Donald B. Kraybill, Negotiating with Caesar, in THE AMISH AND THE STATE 5 (Donald B.
Kraybill ed., 1993).
63. Id. at 6.
64. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210 (1972).
65. Kraybill, supra note 62, at 17.
66. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
67. 406 U.S. at 210.
68. Id. at 21i.
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could... ultimately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish
church community as it exists in the United States today." 69
The Court also considered the purposes of Wisconsin's compulsory
school-attendance law and announced that it was engaged in balancing the
religious freedom and parental rights of the Amish against state interests.70
The Court scrutinized whether the Amish rejection of high schooling was
"a matter of personal preference," or as the Amish maintained, essential to
the preservation of their religious community. 71 Ultimately, the Court
found that the Amish religion determined its members' lifestyle
comprehensively. 7' The Court thus accepted both that the Amish religion
required removing Amish children from school early and that Amish
communities would be gravely damaged if precluded from doing so. The
Court declared, "[T]he Amish mode of life and education is inseparable
from and a part of the basic tenets of their religion."73 Finally, the Court
rebutted the government's contention that if the Amish were exempt from
compulsory school attendance laws, any Amish individuals who later
chose to leave the community would be without useful skills, and so
condemned to dismal lives as burdens on society. 74 The Court deferred to
expert testimony that the Amish continued to educate their youth after
elementary school, albeit in agricultural vocations, and were as successful
at imparting useful skills as the state educational system.75
Yoder seems yet another instance of a sensible judicial
conceptualization of internal restrictions. If we, like the Court, credit the
experts' contentions, then removing children from the formal education
system before high school is essential to the preservation of the distinctive
moral environment that characterizes Amish community. Thus, like Hofer
I, Yoder is an example of how internal restrictions can be recognized as
community self-help and treated accordingly.
As a matter of legal doctrine however, the existence of Yoder as more
than an unprincipled anomaly is suspect. In an extensive line of cases
from Sherbert v. Verner 76 to Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment
Security,7 7 including Yoder, the Court delineated and applied a religious
liberty jurisprudence in which there was a presumption in favor of
exempting religiously motivated practices from otherwise valid laws.78 In
69. Id. at 212.
70. Id. at 214.
71. Id. at 216.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 219.
74. Id. at 224.
75. Id. at 223-24.
76. 374 U.S. 398, 399-401 (1963).
77. 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
78. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 255 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S.
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1990 though, the Court radically changed course in Employment Division
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, the Court declared that
religiously motivated conduct would not be presumptively exempted from
neutral, generally applicable laws.7 9
In a post-Smith jurisprudence, Yoder is no longer a secure result.
Nonetheless, there are reasons to view the decision as justified, even after
Smith. First, apart from general considerations of religious freedom, the
argument of this Note has hopefully shown how certain secular,
normatively desirable goals are served by the religious practices of Yoder.
Second, Yoder may be supported by a broader constitutional right to
associate or to freely shape the expressive associations to which one
belongs.80
C. Internal and External Restrictions: A Distinction Without a Difference?
Before considering a doctrinal test, it is worth taking a second look at
the internal-external distinction itself. As we have seen, Kymlicka places
substantial emphasis on the difference between external and internal
restrictions. While the former target dominant society, seek to constrain it,
and are typically compatible with liberalism, the latter target minority
group members, seek to constrain them, and are commonly supposed to be
illiberal. However, I think there is less of a difference here than might be
thought, and that many if not most internal restrictions are in fact best
conceptualized as external restrictions being pursued in the only way
possible (given liberal tolerance).
To see why, let us imagine a gender-egalitarian family that is attempting
to instill their favored egalitarian mores in their children in the midst of a
pervasively patriarchal society. The family perhaps belongs to a cultural
community that greatly values gender egalitarianism and would like to
nourish lives centered on gender equality. So the group pursues external
restrictions. They attempt to gain control of the governmental
communications commission to censor media (the media in this state is the
main source of patriarchal norms), or to win political power to prescribe
what programming is allowed, or even to pass a referendum giving them
power over censorship legislation. However, this group will almost
certainly fail in achieving its goals-a result in which neutrality-oriented
liberals might well rejoice, since in principle a liberally tolerant society is
committed to permitting these patriarchal influences. In other words,
liberal tolerance forbids external restrictions that aim to shape the
707 (1981).
79. 494 U.S. at 879-885 (1990).
80. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S 640 (2000). Eisgruber and Sager attempt to
exploit Dale as part of a broader attempt to explain widespread intuitions about religious liberty
without conceding a unique value to religion under the Constitution. See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER
& LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 63-67 (2007).
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mainstream moral environment by suppressing negative influences.
Thus, to pursue its egalitarian ethos, our family's community founds a
colony in which individuals are not permitted to own televisions or radios,
on the theory that without some form of restriction, the group's pursuit of
egalitarian gender norms will be far less successful."' Restrictions on
community members' access to media are of course "internal restrictions,"
but their point is to constrain the power of the majority culture in
undermining the distinctiveness of the minority. The community might
prefer an external restriction. After all, its goal is to limit the pressures
exerted on it by mainstream society, and not-as Kymlicka has it-to
stifle dissent.82 But, given the constraints imposed by liberal tolerance, the
only way by which to achieve this goal is through internal restrictions.
Here, the rationale and ultimate target of the restriction is external, but its
immediate object becomes internal. Such internal restrictions, like
external restrictions, are a form of community self-help against the
majority. There seems little of moral moment separating such a practice
from external restrictions, and certainly nothing that can bear the weight
that Kymlicka places upon it.
III. THE COURTS AND INTERNAL RESTRICTIONS: OPERATIONALIZING THE
PRESUMPTION FOR INTERNAL RESTRICTIONS
The normative argument of this paper, if successful, suggests the need
for some guidance in determining which internal restrictions should be
permitted and even enforced by modern liberal states. Surely a group
claiming that it should be able to physically confine or torment its
members should be prevented from doing so, even if it could plausibly
show the indispensability of this practice to the preservation of its
preferred "moral environment." My argument does not purport to
legitimate "internal restrictions" in all cases, but merely to establish a
presumption in their favor. So, I will now try to outline an operational
legal test to differentiate permissible from impermissible internal
restrictions.
The test has three parts. Any restriction that satisfies all three prongs
should be permitted, given the moral presumption in favor of internal
81. Of course, a wise community may not want to reduce to zero its children's exposure to
objectionable messages from the outside world. There is substantial evidence that exposing children
to some pernicious influences and subjecting those influences to criticism strengthens children's
ultimate resistance to these influences. See, e.g., M. Pfau, The Inoculation Model of Resistance to
Influence, in 13 PROGRESS IN COMMUNICATION SCIENCES 133 (F.J. Boster & G. Barnett eds., 1997)
(discussing theory that exposure to weak critical messages and their refutation inoculates individuals
against persuasion by later more powerful critical messages); W.J. McGuire, The Effectiveness of
Supportive and Refutational Defenses in Immunizing Defenses, 24 SOCIOMETRY 184 (1961); W.J.
McGuire & D. Papageorgis, The Relative Efficacy of Various Types of Prior Belief-Defense in
Producing Immunity Against Persuasion, 26 PUB. OPINION Q. 24 (1961).
82. KYMLICKA, supra note 2, at 36.
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restrictions. First, no restriction is permitted that violates basic liberal
rights (e.g., bodily security), which I take to be the rights guaranteed by a
nation's bill of rights or constitutional rights tradition. Second, a
restriction cannot deny a legal entitlement essential to well-being. While a
secondary school education may or may not be a basic right, some
education is essential to well-being and thus may not be denied. Third, a
restriction must be plausibly related to and necessary for the preservation
of a moral environment, and there cannot be an equally effective but
unrestrictive way in which to sustain that environment. Finally, while
presenting no substantive criteria for validating an internal restriction
imposed by a group, Hofer II is useful as a reminder that the process by
which an internal restriction is applied must also be judicially
scrutinized.83 In this sphere, the Canadian Supreme Court seems right in
demanding that the enforcement of an internal restriction satisfy basic
norms of justice as well as whatever rules a community itself might adopt.
Liberal tolerance's forbearance from imposing one vision of the good
life does not amount to a purgation of all considerations of justice from the
law. The first requirement, like the second, reminds us that it is a
defeasible presumption that was argued for, which can be outweighed by
important considerations of justice and human well-being. The third
requirement ensures that internal restrictions bear the proper relationship
to the goals of community protection for which I argued.
This test may seem difficult to satisfy, but it does not render the
presumption in favor of internal restrictions a nullity. The test I have
proposed is not so permissive as to allow the violation of basic liberal
norms, but is sufficiently accommodating of isolationist minorities that a
good many internal restrictions that would be struck down in other
contexts, such as housing' cooperatives, would be sustained here. A
single example should suffice to illustrate the test's real-world workability
and the extent to which it generates results distinct from those implied by
Kymlicka's defense of multicultural rights.
Let us return to the Hutterite property disputes, on which Kymlicka has
written. The restriction in question is the prohibition on private ownership
of any colony assets, which implies the forfeiture of all property claims by
individuals expelled from the Hutterite community. We will assume that
the restriction has been applied in a procedurally fair manner. This internal
restriction is certainly related to and necessary for the preservation of the
distinctive Hutterian moral environment. Both our brief overview of the
Hutterites' worldview and Hofer I made clear how essential collective
property is to the Hutterite's communal way of life, which makes the
83. Hofer v. Hofer, [1992] 3 S.C.R. (Can.) 165.
84. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994) (discussing
reasonableness standard for sustaining restrictions in cooperatives).
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prohibition on private ownership indispensable for them-both necessary
and irreplaceable.
The restriction also does not seem to violate any basic liberal right.
There is no physical coercion against individuals who choose to exit the
community. One might object that liberalism affirms a basic right to
privately own goods and to be secure in that ownership against public
expropriation. Both of these claims are plausible, although not obviously
true. In any case, these rights are not foreclosed by the Hutterites. Every
Hutterite always retains the right to exit and join a world in which private
property can be owned, and property owned by an individual is never
forcibly taken (without compensation). If one freely joins the colony, one
freely gives up one's goods; if one grows up in the colony, one never
owns goods and so cannot have any property expropriated. To make a
property-based criticism stick, what must be maintained is that individuals
have a (possibly inalienable) right to grow up in a system with private
property, which the Hutterite scheme would violate. This claim is both
foreign to many strands of modem liberalism and facially implausible.
There is also the possible claim that a community devoted to the
extirpation of private property ownership denies its members some
entitlement necessary for individual well-being. This objection, too, is
implausible. First, the typical individual in an Amish colony reports
themselves to be happy, representing living refutation of this objection.85
Second, that individuals opt into the colony as adults indicates that at least
some responsible persons view a communal property regime as in their
best interest (at the time); a strident paternalism or a complex false
consciousness view would be necessary to justify foreclosing that option.
Kymlicka seems to reach the opposite conclusion, however. In
Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka discusses Hofer I and approvingly
notes Justice Pigeon's dissent in the case, claiming that it is more
consistent with Rawlsian liberalism.86 Justice Pigeon notes correctly that a
liberal vision of freedom of religion includes an individual right to change
religion at will and that religious groups should accordingly not be
allowed to eliminate this freedom.87 While there was no direct denial of a
right to exit from the Hutterite community in Hofer I (indeed, such a
denial would require coercive violence, which both the Amish and
Hutterites reject), Justice Pigeon maintained that the Hutterite policy of
refusing individuals any property when they left functionally effected a
deprivation of their right to exit. 88
This argument maintains that the internal restrictions of Hofer I
85. See, e.g., BILL McKIBBEN, DEEP ECONOMY: THE WEALTH OF COMMUNITIES AND THE
DURABLE FUTURE 42 (2007).
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contravene the first prong of my proposed test by violating freedom of
religion. This argument fails, however. As a factual matter, it is doubtful
that the deprivation of private property renders the average person
incapable of departing. It provides a robust incentive to remain, but that is
all. Many persons leave their family situation, their relationships, or their
occupations, which offer them financial security, in order to begin a new
life. Both the Hutterites and Amish impart valuable vocational skills to
their members, which are transferable to jobs in the outside world, even if
not the most lucrative ones. Certainly, at the moment of joining the
colony in early adulthood it would be relatively easy to depart. After
decades more in the colony it is more difficult to leave, but one's
transferable skills and the presence of an external social safety net mean
that exit is far from impossible.
At this point, however, I should add a couple caveats, if only to make
clear that I recognize significant difficulties with permitting internal
restrictions. The most important objection may be the most obvious. This
objection accuses my argument for internal restrictions of subordinating
individuals to the good of the group. This objection echoes the Kantian
prohibition on the instrumentalization of persons.89 The objection's
immediate appeal stems from the fact that individuals' behavior is being
shaped by a group for collective ends, which looks a lot like
instrumentalization. That appearance, however, is mistaken.
First, restrictions on individuals' liberty for the sake of collective ends
are legitimate when the purpose of the restriction is to secure justice. The
criminal law, to take the most obvious example, proscribes acts and
thereby limits individual freedom, for the sake of justice. Second, internal
restrictions do not instrumentalize because they are imposed for the sake
of every individual her or himself. The internal restrictions that would
pass the test above must be related to the creation of (what at least the
group believes is) a sound moral environment. The activity that the
restriction is designed to prevent is presumed to be injurious to individuals
and their communities. While those making this judgment may be
incorrect, they cannot be accused of using the individual as a mere
means-as something less than a person.
Now it could also be objected that the inability of a liberal society to
investigate the moral merit of internal restrictions-or the merit of the
moral environment those restrictions aim to preserve-means that
individuals may be subjected to misconceived, futile, and possibly
counterproductive interventions. It is certainly plausible-perhaps
obvious-that some religious minorities will pursue social environments
worse than the default that would exist in the absence of their
interventions. There are several reasons to believe this will not generally
89. KANT, supra note 12.
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be the case, however. First, religious subcultures are consciously adopting
and pursuing a strategy for creating a particular social environment
because they believe that it is conducive to human flourishing. The
default social environment of a pluralistic, liberally tolerant society is not
a product of conscious effort. It is the side-effect of countless individual
decisions, many of which are driven, not by considerations of human well-
being, but by self-interested economic factors. Religious minorities are
reflexively and critically (if in a blinkered fashion) seeking a better moral
environment.
Second, this argument was situated in the context of religious
subcultures whose existence will often depend on the preservation of a
specific social environment. Indeed, the test, sketched above, ensured that
internal restrictions must be necessary elements of a subculture's strategy
for creating a particular environment. As with the Amish's need to instill
their youth with agrarian skills and a sense of community values, or the
Hutterites' need for a collective property scheme, religious subcultures
will often be seriously undermined by the loss of internal restrictions. The
unappealing prospect of the state consciously undercutting these groups
militates in favor of my argument. Of course, the possibility of internal
restrictions aimed at creating prejudicial religious subcultures remains a
disconcerting one, but it is in my view one of those bitter pills that a
liberal society must swallow. Indeed, the willingness to allow such futility
may be part of what makes a society tolerant at all.90
90. Rainer Forst, Toleration, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed.,
Winter 2009 Edition), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/toleration/.
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